On 23 June 1951 Yakov Malik, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, hinted at the possibility of a cease fire in Korea. ' The attainment of the revised political objectives of the United Nations was in sight. The Communists were soon to approach the conference table. The use of force had become less profitable to them than negotiation. Prior to this development the war had been in progress for twelve months. The two months preceding Malik's peace approach are of interest in the general history of the war; and in particular, they provide an interesting insight into the role of 2 Squadron, SAAF, its achievements and its problems.
The Ground Situation
With regard to the ground situation the sixty-four days prior to 24 June 1951 can be divided into two periods: 22 April to 19 May, during which the UN forces successfully resisted the 'Fifth Phase Offensive' of the combined Chinese and North Korean Communist Forces; and 20 May to 24 June, during which the UN forces launched an offensive of their own which was to lead to the stabilization of a Main Line of Resistance (MLR), for the most part just north of the 38th parallel. This Main Line of Resistance was to remain virtually static until the end of the war. (Map 1) By 21 April 1951 the UN forces had established themselves along the Utah and Kansas Phase lines after a successful offensive. 2 On the night of 22 April 1951 the Communist Forces attacked in strength against the United States I and IX Corps in an attempt to recapture Seoul. 3 Although they failed to gain this prestige objective, by 30 April 1951 General Van Fleet, who had taken over command from General Ridgway on 11 April 1951 when the latter had been appointed to succeed General MacArthur, was forced to withdraw to the No-name line. 4 The Communist offensive then came to a halt. General Van Fleet immediately replied with one of his own, designed to deny the enemy the opportunity to build up for a new offensive, by threatening the enemy supply route in the Hwachon area and in the so-called 'Iron
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Triangle'. The 38th parallel was declared to be of no tactical significance and a policy of hot pursuit over this artificial boundary was proclaimed. 5 The United Nations' advance was successful although slowed by rain on 27 -28 May 1951. The retreating enemy ground forces, compelled to move during the day, found themselves exposed to attack from the air. By the end of May the UN forces had re-established themselves along the Kansas line. Here they consolidated their position by stringing barbed wire, clearing fields of fire, laying mines, constructing shelters and plotting artillery concentrations. The United Nations Commander-inChief (UNCINC), General Ridgway, then authorized local advances to gain more favourable ground for defence. Accordingly General Van Fleet launched Operation Piledriver on 1 June 1951, which was to bring the US I and IX Corps to the Wyoming line by 15 June 1951. During this advance they encountered heavy enemy resistance organized in depth, as they approached the base of the 'Iron Triangle'.6
The Air Situation
The war in the air during this period was characterized by two features; the initiation of an intensified interdiction campaign by the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) into which SAAF, ROKAF and RAAF elements had been incorporated, and the implementation of a revised air war plan by the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) in midJune. The FEAF interdiction campaign was named 'Operation Strangle' and had as its objective the cutting off of the MLR from the sources of supply in North Korea and Manchuria. A strip of territory stretching east-west across Korea between the parallels 3sJ 15' and 3gJ 15' was divided into three interdiction zones, a zone being allocated to each of the 5th Air Force, the Navy and the 1st Marine Air Wing. The enemy road and rail systems were placed under 24-hour attack.
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The Aircraft attacking the airfields used the 500lb bombs to pothole the runways, and V.T. fused bombs and rockets for flak suppression. The use of proximity fuses was made possible by the development of an L-bracket which prevented the ordnance being carried on the external wing racks of the fighter-bombers from arming prematurely.1o
The bombs could now be dropped safely from high above the bursting flak, to explode at an altitude where they caused optimum damage. Bombs with six hour delayed fuses were also placed on the airfield runways during the last raid of the day against the North Korean airfields in order to harass the repair crews operating under cover of darkness. a. One flight of four aircraft to be dispatched daily from K-10 on an operational mission landing at K-13.
b. The same flight to re-arm and re-fuel at K-13 and fly another two missions from K-13 on the same day.
c. The flight then had to stay the night at K-13.
d. The next day they were to fly one more mission from K-13, after which they were te return to K-1 O. 15 Twenty ground crew formed the 2 Sqn Rand R detachment at K-13. On 7 May 1951 this Rand R detachment was moved from K-13 to K-16 where the same rotation procedure as for K-13 was applied to the aircrews.
(Map 1)
In practice the rotation procedure through the forward airfields became far more demanding than the instructions of the original Frag Order had indicated. A typical example is that of a flight consisting of Capt G. Kotze, and Us A. B. de Wet, I. Gow, M. Frost and F. M. Bekker. Three of these pilots flew 10 successive missions over a period of five days before returning to K-10. The standard of the ground crews' work can be assessed by the fact that the same four aircraft, Nos. 334, 303, 329 and 306 were used on all 10 missions. The operations for the five days flown by the above pilots have been tabulated below in Table 1 . 
SAAF IN KOREA

Sinuiju Raid
The routine of the interdiction missions was broken on 9 May 1951, when 312 aircraft of the 5th Air Force and the 1st Marine Air Wing participated in Operation Buster, a massive raid on the 26 km. 2 Sinuiju airfield area, which was a major North Korean airbase just south of the Yalu River. This and other airfields in North Korea had reached a stage of repair where they could be used in a CCAF attempt to gain air superiority over North Korea, with the possibility of backing a future Communist ground offensive with air support. The neutralization of these airfields was thus vital. In this major raid there were four distinct tasks: a. the provision of top cover to protect the attacking fighter-bombers from interference from MIG-15's (Sinuiju was very close to the MIG bases in Manchuria), b. flak suppression, c. the actual bombing of the airstrip and the surrounding revetments and supply dumps, and d. the rescue effort by SA-16 and SA-17 flying boats escorted by tactical aircraft.'? These tasks were allocated as follows:
a. The RV time was given as 12h45 and the RV point as XC5005. The orbit time was to be from 13hOO to 16hOO and the orbit point XC3062. (Map 1)20 The attack itself started at 14hOO. 21 Any of the attacking pilots who got into trouble were to head for the orbit area where they could ditch and be picked up by the flying boats. The task of 2 Sqn was to fly combat air patrol (CAP) over the downed pilots and the rescue aircraft.
In fulfilment of this mission, 16 2 Sqn aircraft in four flights of four aircraft each took off, starting at 11h10 with Maj. J. P. D. Blaauw as leader, using the appropriate call sign of 'Ashcake Buster Leader'. They completed their mission without incident. 22 The raid itself was a great success. Besides hitting a number of aircraft on the ground the fighter-bombers destroyed 106 buildings, one large aviation fuel dump, and 26 ammunition and supply dumps. They also inflicted heavy casualties on enemy personnel. All this was achieved at the cost of one Thunderjet damaged. 
Marshall's DFC
One of the most effective missions of the period 28 was one led by Lt G. H. Marshall on 24 June 1951. Together with Capt L. P. T. Eager, 2/Lts J. F. G. Howe and J. P. Verster he was briefed to carry out an interdiction mission north-east of Kaesong. They carried napalm, rockets and .50 ammunition. They took-off at 19h45 and were en route to their target when they heard the airborne controller 'Mosquito Jefferson' call for support from any flight that could hear him. Lt Marshall diverted his flight in answer to the call and the controller indicated the target. It was a concentration of enemy troops about 30km south-west of Chorwon. (Map 1) The enemy were defending themselves with automatic weapons, and 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. The four Mustangs of 2 Sqn attacked through an intense and accurate barrage of enemy fire. So intense was the enemy fire that the controller instructed a USAF flight to stand-by to CAP any of the South Africans who might be hit. 2/Lts Howe and Verster later expressed surprise at having survived the attack. In spite of this opposition the attack was successful, with the enemy sustaining the following losses: one 40mm gun position, two automatic weapons positions and an unknown number of enemy troops destroyed; one 40mm gun position damaged. 28 On 2 July 1951 the courage of these pilots was recognised when the Squadron received notification of the immediate award of the American Distinguished Flying Cross to Lt Marshall and the Air Medal to the other three pilots~9 Tragically 2/Lt Verster was never to hear of his award as he had been killed the previous day ferrying a Mustang from K-10 to K-16. 30 The citation which accompanied the award to Lt Marshall further described the incident:
'Despite poor visibility and in the face of withering enemy ground fire, Lieutenant Marshall, without hesitation and with complete disregard for personal safety made successive hazardous attacks with relentless accuracy on the enemy positions. In an exceptional display of aggressiveness and aeronautical skill he engineered the attacks of his flight with such outstanding airmanship that the optimum damage was inflicted against the enemy without the loss of one of his aircraft.' 13 
Airfield Neutralization
Aerial photographs taken on 6 
The Cost
The going for the UN pilots was not always easy. The Communists were determined to protect their supply routes, supply dumps and airfields from air attack; and besides excellent camouflage techniques, they also employed a heavy anti-aircraft screen. In May 1951 FEAF intelligence officers plotted the positions of 252 anti-aircraft gu ns and 673 automatic weapons. The anti-aircraft gun positions were fixed, but the danger along the main supply routes was truck-towed 37mm Soviet M-1939 automatic weapons. These were effective against targets up to 1 400m;o and were to take their toll on 2 Sqn. Between 22 April 1951 and 24 June 1951, 2 Sqn lost five aircraft as a direct result of enemy ground fire and three to accidents. A further eight were damaged by enemy action. Pilot casualties amounted to three killed (two in accidents) and four wounded. One pilot listed as missing in action was later found to have fallen into enemy hands. The Mustang's liquid cooled engine made it particularly vulnerable to ground fire. This factor, together with the addition to each Communist Chinese regiment of an air defence company armed with Soviet 12,7mm machine guns which were very effective against low-flying aircraft, increased the operational hazard. 41
Test flights against own forces anti-aircraft batteries revealed the extreme vulnerability of the wingman in the two aircraft low-level element, which searched for targets which the enemy concealed with increasing skill. After this test the 18 Fighter-Bomber Wing, including 2 Squadron, changed its armed recce tactics in an effort to avoid further losses. In the new method of armed recce, only the flight leader flew at 100m looking for targets of opportunity, while the remaining three aircraft covered him for flak from 1 200m. 42 Gotze's aircraft was hit in the scoop while he was searching for a downed pilot, but he landed safely after being escorted to K-18. 5o On 1 June 1951, Lt A. Gotze was leading a flight of four aircraft on a low-level recce at about 15m, when a pilot who could not be immediately identified since he did not use his call sign, was heard to say that his aircraft was burning and that he was baling out. The flight leader then noticed that his NO. Armstrong and Lt C. de Jongh from K-16 on a mission to interdict supplies north-west of Namchonjam. West of Sibyonni, at 600m the MAP2 leader called that he had been hit by ground fire and that he was baling out. At 250m a brown object was seen to leave the aircraft, which then crashed into the side of a river bed and broke up. No parachute was seen and there was no sign of the pilot. At 15hOO Cmdt Armstrong led four aircraft on a further search of the scene but still no sign was found of the pilot. They concluded that he had, in fact, baled out at 250m, but that his parachute had failed to open. 57 Conclusion 2 Squadron's main objective at this time was the isolation of the battlefield from the enemy sources of supply. The main threat came from enemy ground fire. In the face of this threat the South African pilots displayed a calm professionalism hallmarked by a high level of mutual loyalty and team spirit, as demonstrated by the manner in which the Squadron OC Cmdt R. F. Armstrong, the 2 I/C Maj J. P. D. Blaauw and Lt M. Mentz exposed themselves to considerable danger in order to assist comrades in difficulties. The general effort of the Squadron showed precision, persistence and courage in carrying out their task, with pilots frequently flying three and even four missions in one day. The efficiency attained by 2 Squadron enabled its officers and men to make a significant contribution to the FEAF effort during this critical period. 
